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Abstract 
The relationship between political parties and referendums received increased attention in 
the literature. While most research focused on the challenges faced by political parties, little 
attention is dedicated to the ways in which they can use referendums to serve their 
purposes. This article analyzes the seven national level referendums organized in post-
communist Romania between 1991 and 2012 and shows how referendums were not used 
primarily as means to reflect citizens’ opinions on policy issues. Instead, they were primarily 
used as electoral strategies for legitimacy purposes or to augment the popularity of the 
initiators or main supporters. In isolated instances, they were oriented against other 
competitors.   
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Introduction 
The general goal of direct democracy is to increase the quality of both input and output 
functions of a political system (Easton 1965). The tools of direct democracy adapt to 
changing demands of the citizenry towards the political system and may help to cure the 
democratic malaise (LeDuc 2003; Newton 2012). The latter resulted from disaffection with 
representative democracy and gradual abandon of the traditional modes of political 
involvement, e.g. electoral turnout in decline, shrinking party membership (Dalton & 
Wattenberg 2000; Norris 2011). To bring the citizens back in, direct democracy allows 
people to express their preference on a public issue, thus providing an important voice in the 
decision-making process. Along these lines Newton (2012, p.9) defines direct democracy as 
“that form of democracy in which citizen power and authority is exercised without the 
mediating influence of the elected representatives and officials of representative 
government”. 
 An extensive body of research illustrated how the use of referendums has both a 
direct and indirect impact on the functioning of contemporary societies, with important 
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implications for political support, accountability, effectiveness of decisions and political 
legitimacy (Franklin et al. 1995; Mendelsohn & Parkin 2001; Papadopoulos 2001; Lupia & 
Matsusaka 2004; Hobolt 2006; 2016; Altman 2011; 2013; Gherghina 2017). If this is the case, 
what happens when referendums – as the most common form of direct democracy – are 
used by political actors to serve their purposes? In providing an answer, this article focuses 
on national level referendums in Romania. The country legislation does not allow for 
bottom-up practices, i.e. citizens cannot call for referendums, in approximately two decades 
the country organized seven referendums (the first in December 1991 and the most recent 
in July 2012). Four of these were required by legislation (mandatory) and three initiated by 
the country president. This article illustrates how the institution of the referendum 
procedure was used in a highly instrumental way by various political actors. As such, the 
referendums were not seen as means to reflect citizens’ opinions on policy issues but rather 
to mobilize supporters and persuade voters. The qualitative analysis reveals how 
referendums were not used primarily as means to reflect citizens’ opinions on policy issues. 
Instead, they were primarily used as electoral strategies for legitimacy purposes or to 
augment the popularity of the initiators or main supporters. In isolated instances, they were 
oriented against other competitors.   
 The article begins with a conceptual and theoretical discussion about referendums 
and political parties. The second section briefly describes the legislative framework for 
referendums, questions in the referendums and party system in Romania. Each of the 
following three sections is dedicated to the context and use of the constitutional 
referendums (1991 and 2003), the impeachment procedures (2007 and 2012) and the 
referendums initiated by the country president. The final two sections include a comparative 
discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
Referendums and Political Parties  
A referendum is defined as the process through which citizens vote on one public issue 
(Butler & Ranney 1994).1 The emphasis is on the issue itself since this implies a choice made 
by citizens between two alternatives. This choice is the answer to one question on the ballot. 
                                                            
1 No distinction between referendums and plebiscites is made. A plebiscite is either an ad-hoc referendum or it 
deals with issues other than laws or bills considered by the legislature, being mainly used for approval of 
policies initiated by government (Suksi 1993, p.10). Since in practice the borderline between legislative 
decisions and other policy decisions is often blurred the generic concept of referendums is used. 
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Following this reasoning, a referendum is the answer to such a question. If more than one 
question is asked in a single day, they should be considered as separate referendums. Apart 
from this conceptual reason, three additional arguments can be brought to substantiate 
such a measurement. First, citizens can choose which of the questions they want to answer. 
There were instances in which the turnout for referendums organized the same day differed 
for the addressed questions. Second, the initiator of the questions asked the same day can 
be different. Third, the questions asked during the same day are often very different.  
 The classification of referendums received increased attention in the literature. In the 
context of this article two categories are useful: the initiator and the outcome of a 
referendum. Suksi (1993) has provided a compelling differentiation between mandatory and 
non-mandatory referendums. The mandatory type is used for specific issues of great 
importance to a political system that can be modified only through referendum. Mandatory 
referendums are also called law controlling (Gallagher & Uleri 1996). Within the non-
mandatory category, Suksi identifies two types: active (introduced by citizens) and passive 
(introduced by state authorities).  
 This article makes an effort at mapping the interplay between referendums and 
political parties. In a broader sense, several scholars have considered referendums intensely 
connected with party politics and electoral outcomes (Vowles 1993; Midtbo & Hines 1998; 
Walker 2003). A visible impact of referendums on the political scene is the way in which it 
shapes the party system. Referendum campaigns are topic oriented and thus do not align 
along ideological differences. Political parties at the fringes of the political spectrum may join 
forces and determine the mainstream parties – otherwise fierce competitors against each 
other – to coalesce against them (de Vreese & Semetko 2004). The topic of a referendum 
may dominate the election and be the main driver behind a government coalition as it 
happened in the Czech Republic with the EU accession referendum (Baun et al. 2006). 
However, referendums may also weaken the organization of political parties and negatively 
affect their public image. The recent example of Brexit illustrated how referendums could 
increase the intra-party cohesion. There are factions belonging to the two different camps 
and parties appear divided in the eyes of the public. This situation may either lead to mixed 
cues sent to their electorate (Scarrow 1999) or to the absence of a firm recommendation on 
how to vote. This political ambiguity increases uncertainty both among voters (regarding the 
capacity of the parties to provide reliable information for decision-making) and within the 
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ranks of the parties. One further challenge faced by political parties in referendums is the 
absence of issue ownership (de Vreese 2006). Unlike in an election campaign in which 
political parties bring to the political agenda their own issues and have the possibility to 
claim ownership, the referendums provide a decision between two alternative policies on 
which several parties align.  
Much emphasis has been placed on the consequences of referendums for political 
parties. Some studies also refer to what political parties may obtain from the use of 
referendums. Such a behavior does not come as a surprise since a referendum is “a tool 
rather than an end in itself, it can be used by various political actors to pursue their political 
goals” (LeDuc 2009, p.49). Rahat (2009, p.99) speaks about three reasons to initiate a 
referendum: avoidance of the need to make a tough decision by putting some problematic 
issues aside and decoupling them from election campaigns, a way to legitimize the decision 
or empower the initiator of a referendum, and a possibility to block a majority decision. 
These reasons do not exclude each other and they can be combined. One example is the 
2016 referendum in Hungary about the migrant quotas. The Fidesz-led government called 
for a referendum in the attempt to avoid making a tough decision on its own, seeking to 
legitimize it through the voice of the people. At the same time, there are instances in which 
political parties couple the referendum topic with election campaigns and use the 
referendum for public legitimacy, e.g. the Czech EU accession (Baun et al. 2006). In 
Germany, political parties introduced direct democracy at state and local level to regain the 
sympathy of voters and to determine them to vote (Scarrow 1999).  
Following this line of argumentation, the empirical sections of this article provide 
evidence regarding the extent to which political parties in Romania used the referendum as 
the appropriate way to resolve an issue in their favor. The referendums were not about the 
submission of a public policy to a direct popular vote but rather about the distribution of 
power between state institutions and the legitimacy of these institutions. The most 
important implication of this strategic use of referendums is that the actor left out is the 
people (Walker 2003), the essence of the entire concept of direct democracy. The next 
section introduces the legal framework, referendums used and the main political parties in 
post-communist Romania.  
 
Legislation, Referendums and the Romanian Parties 
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To understand the legal provisions and the use of referendums in Romania it is important to 
note that the country has a semi-presidential system in which the country president and the 
prime minister share the executive power. Equally important, both the president and the 
legislature are elected through a direct vote and thus have comparable levels of legitimacy 
(i.e. derived directly from citizens). Until 2004, the two types of elections were held 
simultaneously but the 2003 constitution extended the presidential term in office to five 
years so the overlap is quite rare (e.g. legislative election in 2008, presidential elections were 
organized in 2009). This semi-presidential system places the president in a relatively 
ambiguous position between the two figures of the executive, with potential institutional 
deadlocks in cases of cohabitation (Verheijen 1999; Gherghina & Miscoiu 2013). 
Cohabitation refers to the situation when the president belongs to another political camp 
than that of the prime minister and of the parliamentary majority.  
The Romanian legislation covers two types of referendums at national level: 
mandatory and top-down initiated. The first piece of legislation regulating the national 
referendums is the Decree-Law no. 29 / 1990 which institutes it as a possibility to consult 
citizens about the important problems. the way in which the referendum should be 
organized was not explained and was supposed to be the topic of another law. Such a law 
was adopted shortly before the referendum for the adoption of a new constitution (in 
November 1991). Law 67 / 1991 provided details about the organization of the referendum 
and required no participation quorum for results validation. The law was specially designed 
for the constitutional referendum to be organized on 8 December 1991, the first two articles 
making explicit reference to that vote.  
The 1991 constitution (and its 2003 revised version) indicate the two types of 
referendums: mandatory with binding effect only in issues related to constitutional matters 
and impeachment procedures, and top-down initiated (by parliament and president) with 
consultative character. Art. 90 of the constitution reads as follows: “The President of 
Romania may, after consultation with Parliament, ask the people of Romania to express, by 
referendum, their will on matters of national interest”. Law No. 3 / 2000 replaces the 
previous laws on referendums and introduces the participation quorum of 50% + 1 of all 
voters as a requirement for validation of results. It also settles the matters that are 
considered to be of national interest: economic reform and strategy, public and private 
property, public administration issues, education matters, defense, international treaties 
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and European accession. This law was amended several times especially around the 
organization of referendums. In 2009, when the Romanian president called for two 
referendums the law was amended through a Government Emergency Decree (No. 103 / 
2009) and introduced the provision to organize the referendum in the same voting poll 
stations with the presidential or legislative elections, when they take place simultaneously. 
In 2012, when the impeachment referendum was called against the country president, 
another emergency decree (No. 41/2012) removed the participation quorum as a threshold 
for validation. This was overruled by the Constitutional Court and the participation quorum 
remains in place. Law No. 341 / 2013 reduced the participation quorum to 30% of the total 
number of voters, i.e. those registered in the permanent electoral lists. Romania has an 
automatic registration system in which all citizens with a minimum age of 18 years are 
included. One of the major problems of these lists is their slow update. The law introduces 
an additional paragraph in which the referendum is valid when at least 25% of the total 
number of voters registered on the permanent electoral lists cast a valid vote.   
Table 1 summarizes the features of the referendums organized in Romania. These 
will be discussed in detail in the following three sections, including the context around each 
vote. The general observation to be discussed here, in line with the legal provisions, is the 
existence of two invalid referendums although three of them did not meet the participation 
quorum required for validation. The 2007 referendum for presidential impeachment had a 
turnout of 44.5% and was validated by the Constitutional Court without any mention 
regarding the quorum. In its decision (No. 5 / 2007), the Court explains that the majority of 
valid votes was against the impeachment procedure and thus the president can return to 
office. Quite likely, the result was validated due to its negative outcome: since most of the 
citizens who turned out to vote were against the proposal it made little difference in terms 
of the final outcome if the referendum was valid. However, five years later the 
Constitutional Court invalidated (with a six to three decision) the 2012 impeachment 
referendum, regulated by the same legislation as the 2007 referendum. In that case, the 
decision of the Court came after rejecting a Government Emergency Decree and after clearly 
emphasizing before the referendum that the quorum must be met to be valid (see the 
following sections).  
 
Table 1 about here  
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A brief description of the main political parties is relevant to understand the context in 
which referendums were initiated. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) dominates the 
Romanian political scene and won the popular vote in six out of the seven legislative 
elections in which it participated. Formed in 1992 as a splinter of the National Salvation 
Front (FSN), the PSD is a successor party of the pre-1989 Communists. Initially called the 
Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) and then Party of Social Democracy in Romania 
(PDSR), it joined forces in 2001 with the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR) and 
changed its name in the current PSD. It led four coalition governments and was included as 
partner in another one. Its leader was the country president between 1992-1996 and 2000-
2004. Their average political support is around 35%, very stable since 2000; an exception are 
the most recent legislative elections (December 2016) in which the party received more than 
45% of the votes for both Chambers of the Parliament.    
The direct successor of the FSN is the Democratic Party (PD) that changed its name 
into Liberal Democratic Party (PDL) after a merger with a splinter from the Liberals in 2007. A 
relatively small party until 2000, the party was resuscitated by its new leader Traian Băsescu 
who will also become the country president for two terms between 2004 and 2014. It led 
the government coalition in the 2008-2012 term in office and was included twice in 
government coalitions. The party ceases to exist in 2014 when it is absorbed by the National 
Liberal Party (PNL). The latter is a revived party with rich history before communism. 
Established in the 19th century, the liberals often governed the country and were banned 
during communism. In post-communism the party was marked by a large number of splits 
and mergers that did not raise obstacles to notable electoral performance. They were the 
leading government party during the 2004-2008 term in office, joined two other coalition 
governments (in 1996-2000 with the PD, in 2012-2016 with the PSD) and their leader 
became country president in 2014.  
 These three political parties played a major role in shaping and using referendums. 
The party system includes other small size or episodic political parties, involved to a limited 
extent in the use of referendums. Their names and positions will be explored when 
describing the referendums in the following three sections. The description of referendums 
is structured according to topic and not chronological: those addressing the constitutional 
adoption and revision, presidential impeachments, and resident-initiated referendums.   
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The Constitutional Referendums: 1991 and 2003 
The violent events in December 1989 brought to an end the authoritarian regime of 
Ceausescu. The regime change marked the beginning of a transition period in which the 
existence of the previous communist setting was no longer accepted and new institutions 
had to be created. The main tasks of these institutions were to provide a framework in 
which the state could develop, to ensure the functioning of the political system (Berglund & 
Dellenbrant 1994; Elster et al. 1998) and to set the country on the path to democratization 
(Verdery 1996; Holmes 1997). While these issues formed the bases of constitution-making, 
several background elements are relevant for a better understanding of the process.  
In many countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the phase of institution 
(re)building at the end of the 1980s or beginning of the 1990s was preceded by negotiations 
between communists and opposition forces. This transfer of power took place in the so-
called Round Table Talks that were negotiations aiming to establish the bases for a new and 
reformed political system. Romania had only two meetings organized in five days (27 
January – 1 February 1990) and no official representatives of the former regime were 
present. Since communism was overthrown more than one month before, these 
negotiations were the official replacement of the previous regime but without a division of 
power within the “new” political elite (Walsh 1994, p.385).  
The structure of this political elite is crucial in understanding the developments 
leading to the first post-communist referendum in Romania. In December 1989, after the 
end of the communist regime, the country was governed by the FSN. This political 
organization, led by Ion Iliescu (later the leader of the PSD), was the provisional governing 
body of Romania until the first post-communist elections. Initially, the organization 
announced that it is not a political party and would not nominate candidates in elections. 
However, the FSN elites who originated in the secondary echelons of the Romanian 
Communist Party changed their mind and in February 1990 – a few days after the round 
Table Talks – transformed the organization into a party with the same name. It comfortably 
won the legislative election in May 1990 (66% of the votes in the lower Chamber and 67% of 
the votes in the upper Chamber) and its leader won the presidential election organized 
simultaneously with more than 85% of the votes. The FSN organized elections quite fast 
after regime change for two main reasons: its leaders were aware of their popularity among 
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citizens and they did not wish to give opposition forces time to better organize themselves 
(Gallagher 2005). 
At the time, opposition consisted mainly of the historical revived parties that 
governed the country before communism – the PNL and the Christian Democratic National 
Peasant Party (PNTCD) – and the party belonging to ethnic Hungarians: Democratic Alliance 
of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). In spite of their relatively weak appeal to population, 
some of these opposition forces mobilized young people and intellectual elite in large 
protests organized against the FSN until the summer of 1990. Iliescu – interim president of 
the country and FSN leader – called the workers in the coal mines from the Jiu Valley (an 
industrial area in the South of the country) to the capital to spread the protestors with the 
use of violence. This scenario was repeated four times in an interval of 18 months (until 
September 1991).  
Such a history of violence accompanying the first years of transition was possible due 
to the absence of a constitutional framework to settle conflicts in a democratic manner. 
During the first term in office, the government also realized that legitimacy through violent 
means is not a long-term possibility. Instead, the legal way to gain legitimacy was through a 
new constitution – a fundamental law required anyway by the new institutional framework. 
With complete control over all central political institutions (legislature, government, and 
presidency), the FSN could coordinate earlier decisions with the constitutional design. For 
example, the FSN enforced the strong position of the presidential office with its decisive 
influence on government formation. This was rooted in the previous clash between Iliescu 
and Roman and had to do with Iliescu’s desire to hold control over who is nominated as 
prime minister.  
Another example is the provision about close ties between the executive branch and 
the judiciary that allowed for an almost direct control of the adjudication (Hein 2013). Such a 
control was necessary to avoid the implementation of a Lustration Law or any sort of 
prosecution against the elites reproduced from the previous regime. One final example 
refers to the form of government: the FSN pushed to have republic as a form of government 
explicitly acknowledged in the constitution. Furthermore, it also made sure that this article 
cannot be changed by any revision. Overall, the constitution including a great amount of 
provisions that reflected the FSN’s willingness to secure power and strengthen its dominant 
position. 
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The constitutional text was adopted in November 1991 by Parliament and according 
to Art. 47 the constitutional revision is final after its approval through a popular referendum. 
Since this provision did not apply to that situation, a referendum was not required to adopt 
the 1991 constitution.  Nevertheless, the Parliament considered the referendum as the most 
democratic mean to adopt a constitution and decided in that direction (Law No. 67 / 1991) 
Since the law required no participation quorum for constitutional adoption, the constitution 
could be adopted if the majority of those who turned out to polls cast a vote in its favor. This 
happened without any difficulty (Table 1).  
The FSN used the 1991 constitutional referendum as a tool to legitimize its authority. 
In this sense the popular support replaced the previously used violence to achieve specific 
ends. Moreover, popular legitimacy served a longer-term purpose. By approving the new 
constitution, the public agreed to the new shape of the rules of the game according to the 
FSN’s preferences. Once translated into legislation these preferences guided the life of the 
country – from institutional and political issues to broader aspects such as the pace of 
democratization – in the first post-communist decade. The popularity and success of the 
referendum reassured the FSN elites about citizens’ support; such a support continued to 
exist until 1996 when these elites lost for the first time their place in government.  
 
 
 
The 2003 constitutional reform 
Since the 1991 constitution partly served the particular purposes of the party in government, 
its limits were quite obvious from adoption. Over time several political parties called for its 
modification. The foreseen accession of the country to the EU provided the appropriate 
opportunity to bring constitutional amendments. In its preparation for accession the country 
was required to provide rights to European citizens such as the right to property, the right to 
vote in local and European elections, or the right to be elected in local elections. Also, the 
constitution had to make references to the European Parliament elections, to regional 
policies at European level, and the possibility to join the Eurozone in the future. Of great 
importance were also the issues related to state sovereignty that had to be modified as soon 
as Romania became a Member State. The broad pro-accession consensus among the 
political elites belonging to all parliamentary political parties, including the radical right, 
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made it clear that constitution amendment was only a matter of time. While the Greater 
Romania Party (PRM) was the only political actor against constitutional reform, the rest of 
parliamentary political parties demanded it. 
 The widespread desire of political actors to alter the constitution increased the 
saliency of the process and speeded up the reform. The amendment law was initiated by 215 
Deputies and Senators and was adopted on 18 September 2003 in both Chambers of 
Parliament (Senate and the Chamber of Deputies). The referendum called to validate the 
change was the only organized in two days in post-communist Romania (18-19 October). It 
had a turnout higher than 55% out of which a large majority voted in favor (Table 1). The 
stake of this referendum was not the “Yes” vote since it was quite obvious from earlier 
opinion polls that there was major support for the constitutional change among the 
population; this support has been mainly triggered by information campaigns carried out by 
political parties in the media. Instead, the challenge was the potentially low participation 
that could have endangered the entire process of constitutional revision.  
Since the public appeared to bear little interest in the constitutional revision, the 
government intervened to make sure this participation quorum was reached. According to 
allegations of opposition parties and civil society representatives this intervention took the 
form of rigged turnout: numbers were inflated and electoral bribe was provided to boost 
participation (Carey 2004; Hein 2013). Evidence provided by media and foreign observers 
regarding bribery and fraud in the 2003 referendum is consistent with the behavior of 
Romanian political parties in elections. All local, national, and presidential elections since 
2004 have been plagued by attempts made by political competitors to buy the votes of the 
electorate (Gherghina 2013). Given the broad political consensus about the necessity of a 
constitutional change, the referendum served a general goal. However, the government 
party (PSD) interfered with the referendum procedures to ensure its validity and to avoid the 
repetition of the referendum. Overall, the 2003 constitutional referendum cannot be 
considered an instrument to reach the objectives of a singular political actor. Let us now turn 
to another category of mandatory referendums, namely those required to validate the 
impeachment of the country president. 
 
The Impeachment Referendums: 2007 and 2012 
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In post-communist Romania there were two major periods of cohabitation and both ended 
up in institutional conflicts between the country president, on the one hand, and the prime 
minister backed by parliamentary majority, on the other. The first institutional conflict 
occurred in 2007 when the political party backing the country president was excluded from 
the government coalition. Following the 2004 legislative election the government coalition 
was led by an electoral alliance formed by the Liberals (PNL) who received the position of 
prime minister and the Democrats (PD, another successor of the FSN) whose leader became 
country president. Following internal tensions in the spring of 2007, the PD left the 
government coalition. The relations between the leaders of the two parties were tensioned 
even before this “divorce”: the incomplete codification of the relationship between the 
president and the prime minister together with their strong personalities led to frequent 
political clashes. The PNL continued in a minority government together with the UDMR, but 
received parliamentary support from the major opposition party – the PSD. These parties 
announced their intention to impeach the country president (Traian Băsescu) based on the 
following allegations: violation of the constitution, partisanship in favor of the PD (according 
to the Romanian Constitution the president has to be neutral), interference in the 
government's affairs and, more in general, abuse of power through infringement upon the 
authority of the main institutions - the government, the judicial system and the Parliament, 
as well as instigating disrespect for Parliament and the government.  
 The Parliament voted for impeachment and a referendum was scheduled one month 
later. In essence, the impeachment referendum organized in May 2007 was used as means 
by the government to sort out an institutional conflict with the country president. In case of 
a successful referendum, the president had to be removed from office and early elections 
had to be called. In the absence of institutional solutions to diminish he clashes between the 
two figures of the executive, the government made appeal to the solution of impeachment 
and subsequent referendum. Its ability to put in practice such a plan was limited by two 
major factors. First, the government and its supporting parties lacked strong arguments 
against the president. This has been pointed out by the Constitutional Court of Romania that 
gave a negative advisory decision prior to impeachment. According to the opinion of the 
Court the allegations were not solid. Second, the president and his supporters (mainly the 
PD) presented the referendum to the entire citizenry as part of a plot against him. One of 
the messages conveyed during the campaign was that the referendum was merely a strategy 
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employed by the government to get rid of him, an inconvenient person. In doing so, the 
president depicted the entire referendum in terms of “us” (the president as representative 
of the people) vs. “them” (the corrupt elite in Parliament). In the absence of counter-
arguments from the opposing camp, the result of the referendum was favorable to the 
president (see Table 1).  
 
The 2012 Impeachment 
The second impeachment referendum organized in 2012 had fairly similar reasons, targeted 
the same country president (Băsescu), and the reasons behind it were comparable to thos 
from 2007. Following the 2008 parliamentary elections, Băsescu – using a discourse related 
to the global financial crisis - called for the formation of a great coalition between his party 
(the PDL, former PD), the PSD, and the Conservative Party (PC); the latter is quite small and 
has been a traditional ally of the Social Democrats since 2000. These parties gained together 
more than two thirds of the seats in the 2008 legislative election. This coalition lasted until 
October 2009 when the PSD and the PC left the government after repeated attacks against 
their coalition partners. Two months later Băsescu was re-elected as president, winning 
against the PSD candidate (Mircea Geoană) who was supported also by the PNL in the 
second round. He shaped a legislative majority for his party (PDL) with the help of the UDMR 
and using 35 defector parliamentarians from the PSD and the PNL. Following severe 
economic reforms (e.g. cutting public servants’ wages by 25%), the PDL government became 
increasingly unpopular and more parliamentarians crossed the floor to opposition parties. 
Consequently, the parliamentary majority modified and the government got a vote of no 
confidence in February 2012. Băsescu appointed a new prime-minister with close ties to his 
party, but this cabinet also got a vote of no confidence in April 2012. Under these 
circumstances, Băsescu had to appoint a prime-minister from the opposition side. 
 The gradual strengthening of the opposition parties was mainly the effect of the 
decision taken in February 2011 regarding an electoral alliance between the PSD, the PNL, 
and the PC: the Social-Liberal Union (USL). Within the electorate, opinion polls indicated 
increasing popularity that was confirmed at the June local elections in which the USL was the 
clear winner. In Parliament the alliance acted as a coherent and cohesive actor, thus 
managing to pass a vote of no confidence against two governments in a row. Following the 
April 2012 vote of no confidence, the PSD president (Victor Ponta) was nominated as prime 
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minister. The USL government coalition initiated several institutional reforms that were on 
the edge of the legal provisions and challenged the rule of law in the country. First, it 
revoked in a single day the PDL speakers of the two Chambers of Parliament and the 
Ombudsman. The latter was the sole official who could notify the Constitutional Court about 
the abuses committed by the public authorities. The speaker of the Senate is particularly 
important as this is the second position in state. When the president is impeached or cannot 
make full exercise of his functions, the Senate speaker becomes the caretaker. Crin 
Antonescu, the PNL leader and USL co-president, was elected as Senate speaker. Second, it 
passed an emergency decree that withdrew the attributions of the Constitutional Court 
concerning the decisions of the Parliament. These marked the beginning of the conflict as 
Băsescu quickly responded. He denounced the presumptive coup and claimed that the main 
objective of the ‘plotters’ was to gain control over the judicial system. In his view such 
gestures were made to prevent the conviction of some politicians, business and media 
tycoons.  
 At the beginning of July, the Parliament was called to impeach the President for 
violations of the Constitution. The main charges brought to him were quite similar to the 
ones in 2007: infringement upon the government and prime minister’s activities; violation of 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens; violation of the separation of powers and 
judicial independence principles; violation of representative democracy principles; the 
initiation of an unconstitutional project to revise the Constitution, direct pressures on the 
judges of the Constitutional Court, and the abandonment of his mediation role in the state 
and society. The Constitutional Court provided a consultative opinion on each of the eight 
charges. It found that only one was motivated as the President did not act as a mediator 
among the state’s institutions. The Parliament voted in favor of the suspension (256 vs. 114) 
and a referendum was scheduled for 29 July. 
 Following this vote and the low president’s popularity, the government concerns 
were mainly oriented towards the validity of the referendum. The voter turnout in the 
previous Romanian referendums was rarely over 50% but the threshold was required only in 
2003 when the constitution was modified. In spite of the provision from Law No. 3 / 2000 
that requires participation quorum, the 2007 referendum for impeachment was not bound 
to turnout. Accordingly, when scheduling the 2012 impeachment referendum, the 
government wanted to be on the safe side and issued an emergency decree (No. 41/2012) 
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that removed the threshold provision. On 24 July, following the petition of 63 PDL deputies, 
the Constitutional Court overruled the emergency decree and thus the participation 
threshold was required. Parallel to the emergency decree and the PDL objection to its 
constitutionality, one PNL Senator proposed two days for the vote instead of one as usually 
happens with every election or referendum in Romania. This proposal was based on the 
2003 referendum experience, but was rejected by the Judicial Committee in the Senate on 
17 July. The government was successful only in extending the voting time with two more 
hours: it was usually between 07.00 and 21.00, for this referendum votes could be cast 
between 07.00 and 23.00. 
 As in 2007, this referendum had a clear instrumental task: citizens were called to 
legitimize the government policies and to remove from office a president who opposed 
these policies. The camp opposing the president had a similar composition as five years 
before. The impeachment procedure was part of a series of quasi-constitutional reforms 
initiated by the new government coalition and the referendum was the means to achieve it. 
Citizens were again used to solve an institutional conflict. Similarly to the referendum 
organized in 2003, there were allegations of rigged turnout. A few weeks after referendum 
the Permanent Electoral Authority checked the voting lists and identified 118,881 multiple 
votes and 1,082 records with invalid ID card numbers. One of the PSD leaders actively 
involved in campaign is under investigation and several hundred voters have been also 
investigated or cited as witnesses. A successful referendum was likely to provide full control 
of the USL over all state institutions. Once the president was dismissed, early elections had 
to be called (the regular one was scheduled for 2014), quite likely simultaneously with the 
legislative election scheduled for fall 2012. The USL enjoyed large popular support – it won 
approximately 60% of the votes in the 2012 parliamentary election – and thus the likelihood 
of having a president belonging to this alliance was very high. Nevertheless, the participation 
quorum was not met in referendum and thus the results were invalidated although the large 
majority of those who voted (Table 1) approved the impeachment procedure. 
 
The Referendums initiated by the President: 2007 and 2009 
The remaining three referendums organized in post-communist Romania were initiated by 
the country president in 2007 and 2009. Since all were organized simultaneously with other 
types of elections in which the president or his party was involved, the instrumental feature 
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of these direct democracy practices can be easily anticipated. A closer look at them reveals 
this was indeed the case. The 2007 referendum was called by the president half a year after 
the impeachment referendum to which he survived. The issue of this referendum was a 
particular type of electoral system. Until then, Romania used in all legislative election an 
electoral system of proportional representation with closed lists. This means that candidates 
were ranked by a political party on a list and voters had to choose between lists of 
candidates without the possibility to express their preferences for one candidate or the 
other. This system received an extensive amount of criticism from media, civil society, and 
some politicians due to its party centered approach in which political parties decide the 
candidates (Gherghina et al. 2013).  
 Following this criticism, the reform of the electoral system has been on the public 
agenda for a few years. Until 2003 a civil society organization (Asociatia Pro Democratia) 
tried twice to collect citizen signatures to propose Parliament a different type of electoral 
system. The PSD and the PNL also had some initiatives regarding the change of the 
proportional representation system into a majority system with voting in single member 
districts. In 2007, the electoral system reform became salient and Pro Democratia together 
with all political parties had several rounds of negotiations about different types. As a result 
of their meetings, the consensus was that a majority voting system with proportional 
compensation is appropriate for the country. The country president had initially accepted 
this type, but changed his mind after the departure of his party (the PD) from the 
government coalition.2 This issue was part of the ongoing clashes between the president and 
the prime minister that continued after the failed impeachment referendum. The president’s 
main argument was that the system earlier agreed upon and supported by government did 
not encourage a cleaning of the political class (i.e. political parties continued to nominate 
their favorites and citizens could not choose between candidates). As a result, although the 
government took responsibility in front of Parliament for the new electoral system in 
October 2007 based on the government proposal, the president called for a referendum in 
which he proposed an alternative system – two-round majority voting (known also as runoff 
voting). 
                                                            
2 Although formally the Romanian president is not allowed to be a party member, president Băsescu crossed 
that line and got involved in party politics: continued to guide the party, participated at some meetings, 
involved its party in coalition government when it had the possibility etc. This visible partisanship was one of 
the reasons behind his two impeachment procedures. 
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 The referendum was organized in November 2007 simultaneously with the first 
elections for the European Parliament. The referendum had a double task. First, it served as 
an accurate instrument to legitimize the position of the president in its dispute with the 
government. Since the conflict was not settled after the impeachment referendum in May, 
the clashes continued and the president had to reaffirm its position as representative of the 
people. Second, the referendum was used as electoral strategy: the party of the president 
was in opposition for more than half a year and this was a good opportunity to gain visibility. 
The PD had always supported the president’s initiatives and it was always in spotlight when 
the president had an intervention. The important stake was not necessarily the presentation 
in the European Parliament but more a rehearsal before the 2008 legislative election. The 
turnout (26.5%) was mainly due to the low interest for European election and saliency of 
electoral issues among citizens. Although 81% of those who voted agreed to president’s 
proposal, the referendum did not pass due to its failure to meet the participation quorum.  
 
The 2009 referendums 
As a continuation of his conflict with Parliament, started in 2007 when 322 parliamentarians 
voted in favor of impeachment, the country president adopted in 2009 a discourse of 
structural reform. Building on the negative perceptions of the electorate about the political 
class (seen as corrupt), the president advanced two ideas. The first was that the legislature is 
oversized and the number of members should be reduced to maximum 300. At the time the 
Romanian Parliament included approximately 500 members in both Chambers of 
Parliament. The populist message conveyed by the president was that there are too many 
political elites and the legislature will do fine with fewer representatives in parliament. The 
second idea was that the second Chamber of Parliament is a waste of resources and the 
country would do fine with a unicameral legislature. He built his arguments on the similar 
election and functions of the members in the two Chambers. According to this logic, if the 
two Chambers do not differ significantly, then there is no point in having a bicameral 
legislature. Moreover, the president argued that Romania is not a federal country to require 
representation of states in a second Chamber.  
 In light of these arguments, the president called for two referendums on these issues 
– each question addressed separately – at the end of 2009. The problem with these 
referendums lies in their timing since they were organized the same day with the 
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presidential election in which the country president was a candidate. In essence, the issues 
submitted to referendum lied at the core of his electoral campaign and the entire 
referendum can be seen as an electoral strategy. During his term in office (2004-2009) 
president Băsescu took some controversial decisions, actively engaged in institutional 
conflicts, and faced criticism from domestic and international actors. In the absence of major 
accomplishments, his popularity had gradually decreased and opinion polls indicated a real 
threat from challenging candidates. Consequently, Băsescu framed his entire campaign 
around the two referendums and sought to mobilize electoral support around the idea of an 
oversized and incompetent political class. In doing so, he portrayed himself in the role of a 
fighter in the name of the people. The referendums were declared valid with a turnout of 
almost 51% and an approval rate of almost 78% of those who voted, and their provisions 
were included in the 2011 proposal for constitutional revision proposed by the president and 
his party.  
 
The Strategic Use of Referendums 
The previous sections of this article presented the referendums organized in Romania 
between 1991 and 2012. The central argument was that the vast majority of referendums 
were used to serve political purposes rather than to provide citizens a voice in the decision-
making process. Table 2 classifies them according to the typology presented in the 
introduction to this special issue. Three out of the four cells are populated by cases: the 
centripetal type of action with both policy-oriented and institutional goals, and the 
centrifugal type of action with the policy goals in mind. While the referendum on the 1991 
Constitution could be listed in more than one category (i.e. it has institutional goals) it was 
included only in the category that corresponded the most to the goals of the initiators. At 
the same time, the 2003 constitutional referendum is not included in the table because it 
was the only one where a clear instrumental use could not be identified despite government 
involvement in the process. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
To begin with the centripetal and policy category, the 1991 constitutional referendum was 
both called to strengthen the legitimacy of the government and to promote its policies. The 
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increasingly contested FSN government required popular approval for the fundamental law 
that reflected some its core interests. The impeachment referendums that were called to 
settle down institutional conflicts were characterized by centrifugal action and policy 
oriented goals. There were similar reasons behind the president’s suspension and 
composition of the opposing camps. In 2007, the parliamentary majority sought to remove 
from office an adversarial president and thus it was oriented against opponents. The 
president was the informal leader – and former formal leader – of the Democratic Party that 
left the coalition government several months before the referendum. In that sense, this was 
meant as a blow against that party, also in light of the parliamentary elections scheduled in 
2008. In 2012, the USL government used the referendum as means to receive public 
approval for the series of quasi-democratic reforms initiated as soon as it secured a position 
in power. This referendum was oriented against the president as an obstacle against the full 
executive control by the government or parliamentary majority. 
 Three other referendums belong to the category of institutional goals and centripetal 
action since they were used to mobilize voters. The first, organized in 2007 in conjunction 
with the election for the European Parliament, was meant to ensure visibility to the 
president and to his party in the last competition before the legislative election. The 
positioning of the party in opposition took it out of the spotlights and this referendum 
provided the opportunity to get back in the political game. Moreover, the referendum was 
meant to strengthen president’s position in relation to the legislature and executive and 
thus to provide popular support in the ongoing institutional conflict. In the same attempt of 
the president and his party to gain popularity, the 2009 referendums regarding the size and 
structure of Parliament were organized in conjunction with the presidential election in which 
the incumbent president ran (and eventually won). They had election strategic functions 
since they were at the core of the president’s campaign and could clearly influence voter 
preferences. 
 As reflected in Table 2, most referendums either served the goals of government / 
parliamentary majority or those of the president. The latter took advantage of those called 
by himself, while the government sought to pursue particular advantages from those that 
were mandatory. This distinction deserves at least two nuances. On the one hand, the 1991 
referendum brought also benefits to the country president not only to the government. The 
two were closely linked and the pursuit of legitimacy was common to both. On the other 
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hand, the impeachment referendums were not only used by the government to solve an 
institutional conflict, but they were indirectly used also by the president. Since the 
government initiated them, it was expected to benefit the most from a successful 
referendum. 
 This evidence indicates that most referendums organized in Romania were used as 
tools to augment political actors’ popularity (i.e. centripetal action). Irrespective of their 
policy or institutional goals, most of them had straightforward political agendas that were 
recognized by voters to a larger or smaller extent. It is also important to note that there is a 
balance between policy and institutional oriented referendums, all of the latter being 
initiated by the country president. The analysis presented here revealed important features 
of the instrumental use of referendums and explored how various political actors pursued 
specific goals through them. Some of these goals were short-term and did not even pursue 
an implementation of the opinion expressed in the referendums The best examples are two 
out of the three institutional referendums (size and structure of Parliament 2009) in which 
there was no follow-up and the attitude of the elites, including the initiator, was quite 
ambiguous towards the results. Even the referendums that were invalid due to low turnout 
(electoral system 2007, impeachment 2012) were associated with great popularity of the 
initiators in the following electoral contests: the president got re-elected in 2009, while the 
USL gained the majority of seats in the 2012 elections, organized half a year after the 
referendum.  
 These features can better contextualize the populist messages used in most of these 
referendums. Earlier research revealed the presence of such messages in the 2007 and 2012 
impeachment referendums (Gherghina & Miscoiu 2013; Gherghina & Soare 2016), they were 
spread across all the referendums organized starting with the second post-communist 
decade. This type of messages was present already in the campaign for the 2003 
constitutional revision in which political parties referred to this referendum as a view into 
the future. The consensus at the level of political elites produced a general discourse in 
which there was an equivalence sign between the success of this referendum and the EU 
accession. This was the mild beginning and in 2007, with both impeachment and electoral 
system referendums, the discourse moved on the territory of elite vs. the regular people 
that characterizes the populist rhetoric. During the impeachment referendum, the campaign 
of the president was centered on the 322 parliamentarians that voted for his suspension and 
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presented them in antagonism with the values and desires of the ordinary people. The 
opposing camp used similar arguments in which us (the good willing political elite) vs. them 
(the corrupt president and his party) became the motto of campaign. Later that year, in the 
attempt to persuade the public about his version of electoral system, the president used the 
same references to an old-fashioned, obedient to interest groups and self-centered political 
elite.  
 
Conclusions 
This article analyzed the way in which referendums were used by political parties in Romania 
between 1991 and 2012. The findings indicate that most referendums were used as electoral 
strategy to promote the political agenda of the initiator (in the case of policy-oriented 
referendums) or its image whenever institutional changes were targeted. Two out of the 
seven referendums were oriented against political opponents and aimed to weaken their 
position. This instrumentalization of the referendums made room for populist discourses 
that either motivated the decision to call for some of them or characterized the campaign 
before the vote. Moreover, the simultaneous organization of some referendums with 
European or presidential elections in 2007 and 2009 is another indicator of how related the 
two types of voting were for the initiators and how direct democracy was hijacked to 
become direct political advertisement.  
 These findings bear implications beyond the scope of the analyzed single-case study.  
At theoretical level, they reveal the existence of similar drivers behind referendums 
organized in different contexts and on several topics. The typology developed in the 
introduction to this special issue captures the essence of the Romanian referendums and 
outlines how little their organization had to do with the goals of direct democracy. Instead, 
they were used as alternative means to promote the ideas of particular political actors and 
to increase their visibility and public support. This reflects upon a broader mechanism that is 
relevant for the political system and society. Salient and controversial issues in society made 
it to the public agenda but not through the usual means of political debate. In this sense, the 
referendums were guided to serve legitimacy and electoral purposes by hiding these 
intentions behind the idea that public preferences will influence the decision-making.  
At empirical level, the Romanian case brings supplementary evidence to the general 
idea that political parties and politicians use and abuse referendums to serve their goals. 
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This contributes to the entire debate about the vices and virtues of direct democracy by 
indicating that referendums per se are not the problem, at least in this case, but the way in 
which they are used. This type of evidence feeds back into the relevance of intended goals, 
outlined in the introduction to this special issue.   
The exploratory nature of this article does not allow for deeper insights and this can 
be a fruitful avenue for further research. Understanding how and why the instrumental use 
of referendums can be damaging for direct democracy are important issues to be discussed 
by future studies. This can be done either through a process-tracing analysis of the events or 
even through a public survey aimed at capturing the opinions of ordinary citizens about what 
happens with the use of referendums by political parties. This perception may also be an 
opportunity to take a closer look at the demand side of direct democracy, what Romanians 
expect from a referendum, irrespective of its instrumental use by political parties.  
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Table 1: The referendums organized in Romania 
 December 1991 October 2003 May 2007 November 2007 November 2009 November 2009 July 2012 
Topic Adoption of a 
new constitution 
Constitution revision Presidential 
impeachment 
Electoral system 
(majority vote) 
Unicameral 
parliament 
Size of 
parliament 
Presidential 
impeachment 
Type Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Top-down Top-down Top-down Mandatory 
Initiator Parliament Parliament Parliament President President President Parliament 
Turnout (%) 67.3 55.7 44.5 26.5 51 51 46.2 
Votes YES (%) 77.3 89.7 24.8 81.4 72.3 83.3 87.5 
Votes NO (%) 20.4 8.8 74.5 16.2 20.7 10.5 11.2 
Result Valid Valid Valid Not valid Valid Valid Not valid 
Note:   The “yes” and “no” votes are calculated from the total number of votes. 
Sources:  Nohlen & Stoever (2010), Central Electoral Bureau. 
  
Table 2: The Instrumental Use of Referendums in Romania  
  Type of Intended goals 
  Policy Institutional 
 
Type of action 
Centripetal (party-oriented) 
 
Constitution 1991 
 
Electoral System 2007 
Size of Parliament 2009 
Unicameral Parliament 2009 
Centrifugal (vs. opponents) 
Impeachment 2007 
Impeachment 2012 
 
 
 
